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1 August 1963

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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West Germany: (Chancellor Adenauer is privately showing little enthusiasm for the nuclear test-ban agreement.)

(The great danger, in his opinion, is that the agreement will generate an attitude of relaxation among some governments. This, he feels, could undermine NATO's vigilance and thus cause a general weakening of Western defenses. He has also emphasized that East Germany's adherence to the treaty would inevitably enhance that regime's status and thereby complicate Bonn's foreign relations.)

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(Foreign Minister Schroeder has taken a more positive approach by publicly asserting that he sees no difficulties in Bonn's accession to the treaty, although he, too, is concerned about the East German angle. Schroeder said a nonaggression pact should specify German reunification as one of its goals, and should contain safeguards for West Berlin in the meantime.)

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*East Germany: Ulbricht's remarks on foreign policy in his 31 July speech to the East German parliament were designed to back up Moscow's cautious policy toward Berlin and to justify it to the East German regime.

Ulbricht implied, however, that there might be unspecified actions against certain Western rights in Berlin, though he gave no clear indication of their timing and nature. He catalogued a series of long-standing East German grievances, such as alleged Allied misuse of the air corridors and the presence of Allied military patrols in East Berlin, in such a way as to suggest the Communists may at some later date take action on them in a display of East German sovereignty.

Within the past month, Khrushchev has on a number of occasions alluded to his ability to harass the Allied forces in West Berlin without running any risk of serious consequences. Khrushchev told Belgian Foreign Minister Spaak on 9 July that while President Kennedy had a "foot in Berlin," he would "step on his corns any time he wanted to." He added, however, that any such actions "would not cause any serious results."

The Soviet leader has been deliberately vague and ambiguous on the timing of any move in order to retain the maximum amount of flexibility in any further serious discussion of East-West questions. [REDACTED]

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Bolivia: The long-standing dispute between the government and Communist-led miners may be reaching a climax.

On 29 July, miners from the large Catavi tin mines, a hotbed of antigovernment sentiment, attacked a nearby village. The miners killed at least seven persons, including the local progovernment peasant leader. They also captured a large cache of arms and took over the state mining corporation's radio facilities in Catavi.

The national peasant organization has issued an ultimatum giving the government ten days to bring the criminals to justice or its militia will take matters into its own hands. For their part, the Communists have mounted some noisy demonstrations in support of the miners and are agitating for more strikes.

So far, President Paz remains hopeful of keeping the situation under control with the civil and peasant militia forces at his disposal.

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Algeria-USSR: The Soviet Union may be preparing to increase substantially its assistance to Algeria.

A delegation of Soviet "economic experts" bearing an "important message" from Khrushchev arrived in Algiers on 29 July, following a visit by a team of Soviet geological, petrochemical, and agricultural technicians. The recent return of Ambassador Abramov from an early "vacation" in the USSR may be related to Soviet plans to offer Algeria an aid package.

Soviet bloc trade and aid activity in Algeria has been carried on largely by satellites. The USSR has undertaken directly only such minor projects as clearing mine fields and providing some medical teams. In May and June, approximately 280 Algerian naval personnel departed for one to three years of training in the USSR. Some 80 pilot and telecommunications trainees and a number of Algerian university students are also studying there.

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Congo (Brazzaville): Trade union critics of conservative President Youlou are becoming more outspoken, and there appears to be some danger of disturbances in Brazzaville in the near future.

Since last June, a group of trade union leaders has called for a change in the government leadership to prevent Youlou from establishing a "dictatorship." Youlou has countered by suggesting that constitutional changes are needed. He has also proposed to create a single party with collective leadership, presumably on the model of those operating in Guinea and Ghana.

The labor organizations are weak, but their leaders are personally influential and seem capable of arousing urban crowds. The leaders at first appeared to accept Youlou's proposals, but agitation has resumed.

[REDACTED]

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The agitators are probably motivated basically by a desire to prevent the government from taking over their labor organizations. They can capitalize on widespread dissatisfaction with Congo's rate of economic and social development.

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[REDACTED]

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Portugal: (Usually pro-American military officers are resentful over US restrictions on Portugal's acquisition of military equipment which might be diverted to Africa.)

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(This resentment may cause further difficulties in the Azores base negotiations. Gen. Mira Delgado, the air force chief of staff, has told the US chief of MAAG that he found Washington's unwillingness to approve the transfer of MAP trainers and jet fighters to Portugal "very offensive" and that he was resigned to the fact that Portugal could expect no further cooperation from the US in military matters.)

(The chief of naval staff is also on record as saying recently that Portugal could no longer continue to accept "always being distrusted and doubted by an unfaithful friend.")

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Iran: (It now appears certain that parliamentary elections will be held in the latter half of September. Candidates are to be selected by the Shah and his advisers with a view to ensuring support for his reform program, although some nominal opposition will probably be permitted. Reactionary religious elements have already indicated that they will agitate against the rigging of the elections, but most of the top leaders of this group are still in custody for having instigated the rioting in early June.)

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

(The United States Intelligence Board, on 31 July 1963, approved the following national intelligence estimate:

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SNIE 13-4-63: "Possibilities of Greater Militancy by the Chinese Communists")

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